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1. Introduction 
The primary aim of our three-year long research project was to map the legal consciousness of 
everyday people by means of a questionnaire-based survey with special regard to new 
regulations of criminal law. 
The questions were related to 12 topics ranged from the age-limit of criminal responsibility for 
crimes against property, through cruelty to animals, to active bribery of public officials. 
In line with the objective of the research project, in the first round we selected topics the 
regulation of which changed in the last decade(s). Within this, we favoured topics connected to 
everyday life and appear frequently in the media. Thirdly, we also took into consideration 
whether or not previous empirical research projects focused on the given topic. Therefore, we 
would be able to measure not only the level of legal awareness of new regulations, but also 
changes in legal knowledge. 
In proportion to the complexity of the regulation, we used two to four well-defined cases related 
to each topic. One of the cases targeted the new element of the regulation. We also used one or 
more ‘control cases’ which were related to an element of the regulation remained unchanged.  
Respondents had to answer a pair of questions for each case. In one respect, they had to decide 
whether or not the act described was criminalized. Furthermore, they were also able to give an 
answer whether or not they would have declared the act as a criminal offence, if they were the 
legislators. 
The questionnaire was conducted between 12 and 17 October 2018 on a nationwide sample 
representative of the adult Hungarian population with the involvement of the Median Public 
Opinion and Market Research Institute. The data collection took place at the respondents’ 
apartment, using a structured questionnaire, within the framework of omnibus data collection. 
The interview was conducted under the supervision and assistance of the interviewer, using a 
self-completion procedure on a sample of 1,200 people representing the adult population (over 
18 years of age) in the country.1 
 
 
2. FOLLOWING THE WAKE OF LEGAL CONSCIOUSNESS: A SHORT 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Two traditions of scientific analysis of legal consciousness may be distinguished: 1) the 
American conception, derived from Roscoe Pound, whose focus is on written law, even when 
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researching “law in action”. So the aspect belongs to the lawyer; 2) the European conception 
which is related to Eugen Ehrlich, and ‘this primary focus of this conception is: What do people 
experience as 'law'?’.2 
Most empirical research until the 1970s was based on the fact that public knowledge and 
opinion about (primarily written) law were measurable, so their most commonly used method 
was the large-sample survey. This has come to be called the KOL (knowledge and opinion 
about law) literature. In contrast, in recent decades, researchers have assumed that legal systems 
are not simply 'social facts acting upon society' (law and society). Instead, law is the label given 
to a certain aspect of society (law in society). They focused primarily on what ideas people have 
about law and legal institutions. The methodology of these studies, in contrast to the KOL 
research, is characterized by descriptive ethnography.3 
Engel distinguishes two alternative meanings of legal consciousness: 1) aptitude, competence 
or awareness of the law; and 2) perceptions or images of law.4 According to Hertogh, most 
studies on legal alienation focus on two basic questions: “Are people aware of the law?”, “Do 
people identify with the law?”5 
Research on legal consciousness is not only suitable for comparing different societies and 
groups, but also for comparing different perceptions and understandings on different branches 
of law.6 The need for a narrower focus has already arisen in research on legal awareness: 
„Different substantive areas of law are associated with different perceptions, understandings 
and behaviours and must, therefore, be distinguished in research on legal consciousness”7 
In Hungary, in the 1960s and 1970s, legal awareness surveys were conducted by Kálmán 
Kulcsár and András Sajó. This projects were designed to measure legal awareness with 
quantitative tools, usually on a national representative sample. These questionnaires used, inter 
alia, questions focused on criminal law,8 including a question related to active bribery of public 
officials.9 These analysis of the results of these researches touched the question whether data 
mirrors positive legal knowledge or simply the standards of moral norms or the influence of 
social practice.10 
These KOL researches “created a tradition that can be continued today. This tradition offers an 
excellent starting point for comparative studies in terms of the empirical data, methodology and 
theoretical conceptions”.11 Fekete and Gajduschek repetead partly a survey of Kulcsár to assess 
the “changes in knowledge about law in Hungary in the past half century”.12 
After the change of regime in 1989/1990 surveys on legal knowledge became less common. 13 
Survey questions related to criminal law occurred sporadically,14 however, knowledge and 
opinions about active bribery was not included in these questionnaires. 
 
 
3. REGULATIONS OF BRIBERY OF PUBLIC OFFICIALS 
In this title, we review incriminations of Hungarian criminal law directed to active bribery of 
public officials. We reviewed not only the current regulation (in force in 2018 when the 
                                                             
2 Hertogh (2004) 475. 
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4 Engel (1998) 109–144. 
5 Hertogh (2010) 15. 
6 Hertogh (2018) 60. 
7 Engel (1998) 140. 
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questionnaire was conducted), but the previous one (in force in 2008) and the regulation of the 
1960s (when the research project of Kulcsár was conducted). 
Hungarian Criminal Code of 1961 (HCC of 1961) criminalized if an advantage was given to a 
public official which may influence his or her official activities to the detriment of public 
interest.15 According to legal literature, this regulation may include, subject to certain 
conditions, remuneration for the performance of the official duty’.16 It was noted that ‘a benefit 
given as a token of gratitude might have a detrimental effect on the public interest if the custom 
of presenting an official with a gift becomes well known among the persons concerned’.17 
The original regulation of the Hungarian Criminal Code of 1978 (HCC of 1978) also provided 
for the punishment of ‘any person who gives or promises unlawful advantage to a public official 
which may affect the official in his official capacity to the detriment of the public interest’. 18 
According to the legal literature, this offence description penalized even those cases in which 
the person granted the advantage has no pending (or prospective) case before the public 
official.19 
Act CXXI of 2001 amended the regulations of HCC of 1978, it made punishable if ‘any person 
gives or promises unlawful advantage to a public official’. This offence of active bribery could 
have been committed, inter alia, ‘if the giving […] of an advantage occurs after the case was 
completed by the public official, even without prospect of the opening of another case’.20 
Under Hungarian Criminal Code of 2012, active bribery of public officials may be committed 
by anyone who “attempts to influence a public official by giving or promising an unlawful 
advantage”. Pursuant to the official reasoning attached to the proposal of the Criminal Code, 
‘the legislator thus indicates that […] the purpose of the advantage is to influence the public 
official’.21 Therefore, the new offence description of active bribery of public officials includes 
a new element of mens rea, namely a special intent.22 
The Supreme Court also noticed that the regulation changed in its two aspects. On the one hand, 
the legislature supplemented the offence description with a new subjective element (namely 
»the purpose of influencing«) with a reference to the future. On the other, HCC of 2012 attaches 
importance to “temporality” and, contrary to the previous law [HCC of 1978], excluded the 
subsequent remuneration of the public official for an official act completed in the past. This 
regulation limited the scope of incrimination to advantages aiming at any current, consequently, 
ongoing, as well as future, consequently, prospective cases.23 
According to one part of the legal literature, the new regulation of active bribery should be 
abolished, and it would be wise to restore the former regulation of HCC of 1978. Undue 
advantages given subsequently may be detrimental to the trust in impartial public 
administration, and therefore should be criminalized. 24 
Respondents were asked to answer the questions regarding the following two cases:  
1. Someone presents a gift worth HUF 30,000 to a public official when he or she applies 
for permission from the government to run a buffet. 
2. Someone presents a gift worth HUF 30,000 to a public official after he or she has 
received the permission from the government to run a buffet. 
                                                             
15 Hungarian Criminal Code of 1961, § 153, paragraph 1. 
16 Wiener (1972) 303. 
17 Wiener (1972) 287, 303. 
18 Hungarian Criminal Code of 1978, § 253, paragraph 1. 
19 Bócz (1986) 738-739. 
20 Vida (2005) 415. 
21 Official reasoning attached to § 293 of the HCC 2012. 
22 Sinku (2012) 435. 
23 Supreme Court of Hungary, Bhar. III. 396/2017., EH 2018. 13., [72]. 
24 Hollán (2014) 81. o. 
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The second case concerns the regulatory novelty, i.e. according to the Hungarian Criminal Code 
it does no longer constitutes a criminal offence, if someone gives undue advantage to a public 
official after the case was completed (e.g. the permission to run a buffet was given). 
 
 
4. RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
Based on research history,25 we presumed that average people have gaps in their knowledge on 
active bribery of public officials. Compared to other criminal law issues, we expected a lower 
level of knowledge, given that these criminalized acts are not inherently evil (mala prohibita). 
We presumed also that, similarly to other criminal law issues, the level of legal knowledge on 
active bribery would not really differ based on the usual socio-demographic variables (gender, 
age, education, type of settlement, occupation, religiosity, financial situation, household 
composition). 
In harmony with our general research hypothesis, we also presumed, that older regulations on 
active bribery of public officials would be more well-known among people. Namely, in this 
respect, the respondent was more likely to have heard of the regulation or to have come into 
contact with it in some other way. 
 
 
5. ANALYSIS OF THE RESULTS  
 
5.1. Legal knowledge 
5.1.1. In general 
Considering unlawful advantages given in advance, nearly half of the respondents (47 %) 
answered (correctly) that this is criminalized under HCC of 2012. This is somewhat lower than 
the average rate of the correct answers (56 %) for all knowledge-based questions of the survey.  
In comparison with this, more respondents (58 %) knew (correctly) that it is not a criminal 
offence for someone to give a gift of HUF 30,000 to a public official after receiving the 
permission from the government. This corresponds to the average of the correct answers 
established for the whole questionnaire. 
 
Table 1 
Giving advantages before the case was 
completed. Is it criminalized? (%) 
 
knowledge 
is criminalized  47 
is not criminalized  51 
does not know 2 
* without those who (N=29) did not answer any of the situational questions  
 
Table 2 
Giving advantages after the case was 
completed. Is it criminalized? (%) 
 
knowledge 
is criminalized  40 
is not criminalized  58 
does not know 2 
 
* without those who did not answer any of the situational questions (N=29) 
                                                             
25 Cf. title 2.  
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Only 11 % of respondents were fully informed about the content of incriminations on active 
bribery of public officials. Nearly half of the population (48 %) was of the opinion that none of 
the acts was penalized as a criminal offence. Conversely, the other large group, more than a 
third of the respondents (37 %), believed that both acts were criminal offences. It could be 
established then, that those who only answered one question correctly (85 % in total) actually 
followed a pattern: they either did not consider either case to be a criminal offence or regarded 
both as criminal offences. 
 
Table 3 
Giving advantages to a public 
official … 
after the case was completed 
criminalized  not criminalized 
before the case 
was completed 
criminalized  37 11 
not criminalized  4 48 
* without those who answered any of the questions like ‘I do not know’. 
 
 
Table 4 
Different combinations of correct answers (%) 
  
they only know that it is criminalized if someone gives a gift before the 
case was completed 
37 
they only know that it is not criminalized if someone gives an advantage 
after the case was completed 
48 
they answer both questions correctly 11 
they do not answer either of them correctly 4 
TOTAL 100 
* without those who answered any of the questions like ‘I do not know’. 
 
Table 5 
Number of correct answers (%) 
 % 
 
none 4 
one 85 
both 11 
                        Total                          100 
 
Only 15 % of respondents think that it was criminalized differently if the undue advantage is 
given at the time of applying for a permit or after the permit has been granted. Therefore quite 
a few people is aware of the distinction (‘temporality’) on which the current Hungarian criminal 
legislation is based. 
 
5.1.2. Knowledge of old and new elements of the regulation 
More people answered correctly the question when it was connected to the novelty of the 
regulation (58 %), than to its unchanged element (47 %). However, this is presumably explained 
by the schematic nature of the responses, since four-fifths of those whose responses reflected 
regulatory novelty also said (erroneously) that the other situation would not be criminalized. 
More than one third of the respondents answered the questions in line with the old regulation 
(37 %), and only one-tenth of them followed the provisions of the new criminal code (11 %). 
However, this was not necessarily due to their actual knowledge of the older regulation The 
proportion of those who believe that neither type of act is criminalized is even higher (48 %), 
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and this belief does not correspond to the regulation of either the current or the older criminal 
code. 
 
5.2. OPINIONS about Criminalizations 
Nearly three-quarters (73 %) of respondents would criminalize giving unlawful advantages in 
advance. Slightly less, two-thirds (67 %) of those surveyed would criminalize the same 
behaviour if the client gives the gift to the official after the permit was granted. 
 
Table 6 
Giving advantages before the case was 
completed. Should it be criminalized? (%) 
 
opinion 
criminalize 73 
do not criminalize  25 
does not know 2 
* without those who (N=29) did not answer any of the situational questions  
 
 
Table 7 
Giving advantages after the case was 
completed. Should it be criminalized? 
(%) 
 
opinion 
criminalize 67 
do not criminalize  31 
does not know 2 
 
* without those who (N=29) did not answer any of the situational questions 
 
The majority of respondents (63 %) would criminalize giving of prior as well as subsequent 
advantages, so they agree with the former regulation. However, the proportion of those (22 %) 
who would not criminalize either act is not negligible, either. This also indicates that the 
temporality of giving an unlawful advantage as assessed by statutory law, is irrelevant to the 
majority (85 %) even in terms of their opinions. 11 % of the respondents would criminalize 
only if gifts given in advance, therefore the opinion of this one-tenth of the population is in full 
agreement with the current regulation. 
 
Table 8 
How many of the two acts would you criminalize? (%) 
neither 22 
one 15 
both  63 
total 100 
 
 
Table 9 
The different combinations of the opinions formed on criminalisation (%) 
 opinion 
they would only criminalize giving an advantage before 
the case was completed. 
11 
7 
 
they would only criminalize giving a gift after the case 
was completed. 
4 
they would criminalize both cases 63 
they would criminalize neither case 22 
TOTAL 100 
 
5.3. Relations of knoledge and opinions  
5.3.1. Opinions and legal knowledge 
In both cases, the majority knows the law according to their opinion (67 %). If there is a 
discrepancy between opinions and actual legal knowledge (the presumed regulation), it tends 
to influence towards criminalisation (30 % in both cases). Only a negligible (3 %) proportion 
say that the law punishes something they would not punish to their hearts.  
 
Table 10 
Pearson correlation between knowledge and opinions 
(Each correlation was statistically significant at p = 0.01 (2-tailed).) 
 
There is a strong coincidence between knowledge and opinion, but the direction of this 
connection could not have been established by statistical analysis. According to our assumption, 
the respondents were guided by their opinions when they ascertained whether certain 
behaviours are punishable or not. It may be supported by the facts that opinions correlate most 
strongly with one another, then with the knowledge appertaining to the same case and then with 
the knowledge appertaining to the other case. 
 
Table 11 
Opinions on criminalisation compared to presumed regulation 
(only among those who also reported on the knowledge of the given regulation and their 
opinion on it, %) 
 Their opinion 
agrees with 
the presumed 
regulation 
Would 
criminalize  
Would 
decriminalize 
TOTAL 
Giving advantages 
before the case was 
completed 
67 30 3 100 
Giving advantages after 
the case was completed 
67 30 3 100 
Giving advantages …  before the case was 
completed 
after the case was completed 
knowledg
e 
opinion knowledge opinion 
before the 
adjudication of the 
case 
knowledg
e 
1 .419 .714 .263 
opinion .419 1 .275 .645 
after the 
adjudication of the 
case 
knowledg
e 
.714 .275 1 .430 
opinion .263 .645 .430 1 
8 
 
5.3.2. Critical or conformist attitudes 
Inspired by Hertogh’s model,26 we compare opinions not only with the presumed but also with 
the actual regulation. Based on this, we find a considerable difference between the two 
situations. 
With regard to gifts given when the client applied for a permit, 30 % of respondents is critical, 
but uninformed. They consider it appropriate to criminalize this behaviour, but they 
(mistakenly) believe that it does not constitute a criminal offence according to our current law. 
Their attitude is, therefore, only critical to the law they presume, they actually agree with the 
actual regulation. 
 
Table 12 
Giving undue advantages before the case was completed. Is it criminalized? Should it be 
criminalized? (%) 
 criminalize do not 
criminalize  
is criminalized  45 3 
is not 
criminalized  
30 22 
* without those who answered any of the questions like ‘I do not know’. 
In terms of giving an undue advantage after the completion of the case, however, nearly one-
third of the population (30 %) is critical, but informed. They consciously want to criminalize 
this type of act, that is, by being aware of it: it is not a criminal offence at the moment. 
 
Table 13 
Giving undue advantages after the case was completed. Is it criminalized? Should it be 
criminalized? (%) 
 criminalize do not criminalize  
is criminalized  38 3 
is not 
criminalized  
30 29 
* without those who answered any of the questions like ‘I do not know’. 
Just as many (11 %) consider an advantage given at the time of applying for a permit or after 
receiving a permit as differently as they know that this is how the law distinguishes between 
the two situations (11 %), but the two groups do not include the same respondents. Those who 
know the difference correctly would largely (57 %) treat the two situations differently 
themselves, but one-third (35 %) would also criminalize presenting the gift subsequently, while 
8 % would not criminalize either case. 
 
Table 14 
Giving advantages. Should it be criminalized? (among those who correctly know the legal 
regulation of both situations, N = 115; %) 
 after the case was completed 
criminalize do not criminalize  
before the case was 
completed 
criminalize 35 57 
do not 
criminalize  
0 8 
 
                                                             
26 Cf. title 2. 
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5.3.3. A multiple variable analysis 
We used a multiple variable analysis to ascertain whether opinions or socio-demographic 
variables affected more strongly the level of legal awareness. The dependent variable of the 
binary logistic regression model was the Boolean, correct/incorrect response for each situation. 
Among the independent variables, in addition to typical socio-demographic variables, we 
included the knowledge about the regulation of the other case and the opinion about the given 
situation.27 
The model explained 63 % of the standard deviation in knowledge of the regulation of undue 
advantages given in advance (Nágelkerke R²=0.630.). The strongest influence was on the 
responses to the questions regarding knowledge of the regulation of subsequent gifts [exp 
(B)=38.138], as well as the opinions formed about simultaneous pecuniary advantages [exp 
(B)=11.070]. There were slightly more correct answers if there was a minor in the household 
[exp (B)=0.623], or with the advancement of the respondent in age [exp (B)=0.980]. 
The situation was similar for presenting a gift subsequently. The model explained 67 % of the 
standard deviation [Nágelkerke R²=0,673]. The strongest influence in this case was also the 
answers given to the question about giving advantages in advance [exp (B)=45.138], as well as 
the opinions formed about presenting a pecuniary gift subsequently [exp (B)=11.103]. In this 
regard, the size of the settlement showed a significant (p=0.05) correlation [exp (B)=0.886]. 
The proportion of correct answers was slightly lower among those living in a larger settlement. 
There was also a weak relationship with education: the correct answer was somewhat more 
likely among those having better education [exp (B)=1.642]. 
This analysis, therefore, confirms that answers to knowledge-related questions are mostly 
influenced by two factors: the rather schematic legal knowledge of respondents, and their 
opinion whether the act is to be criminalized. 
 
 
6. LEGAL CONSCIOUSNESS IN TRANSITION 
 
It is worth comparing the results of our project with a similar research conducted by Kulcsár 
forty years ago. Therefore, we can draw conclusions not only about the awareness of new 
criminal law provisions, but also about changes in legal consciousness. 
In his research, Kulcsár asked a single question on legal knowledge regarding active bribery of 
public officials, namely about subsequently given gifts. That question read as follows: ‘P.V. 
receives a housing allocation. He sends a watch to the public official out of gratitude. Is 
presenting a gift allowed in such a case? .28 In this respect the modification of criminal law 
provisions gives rise to a particularly interesting comparison, since in 1965 this act was 
classified as a criminal offence, but it was no longer criminalized in 2018.29 
In 1965, nearly eight-tenths (78 %) of those surveyed knew (correctly at the time) that it was a 
criminal offence to give an advantage to a public officials after the case had been decided. By 
2018, the proportion of those who think so has almost halved. Only 40 % of the population 
believes (incorrectly, but and in accordance with the previous legislation), that this behaviour 
                                                             
27 The following independent variables were included in the analysis: Gender (1: male; 2: female); Financial situation 
(1: better; 2: about the same as; 3: worse than other Hungarian families) Size of settlement (less than 1: 1000 
inhabitants; 8: more than 100,000 inhabitants, 9: Budapest) Do you go to church? (1: several times a week; 6: do 
not go to church or religious gatherings at all); Do you have a job? (1: full-time; 8: inactive earners); Size of family; 
Number of persons above 60; Number of children under 18; Per capita income; Age; Educational attainment; Do 
you watch the news on TV? (0: do not; 1: watch RTL or TV2 Híradó at least once a week); Were you involved in 
a criminal offence? (0: no; 1: yes); Do you read a daily newspaper? (1: no; 2: yes); Is presenting a gift subsequently 
criminalized? (1: is criminalized; is not criminalized); What do you think about presenting a gift in advance? (1: 
should be criminalized; should not be criminalized) 
28 Kulcsár (1967) 40. o. 
29 Cf. Title 3. 
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constitutes a criminal offence. However, the majority (58 %) – in accordance with the new 
regulations – knows that presenting a gift subsequently does not constitute a criminal offence.  
However, it would be premature to conclude from this that the change in legal consciousness 
would result from the knowledge of the regulations in force since 2013 onwards. Scilicet for, 
48 % of respondents (namely four-fifths of the above mentioned 58 %) gave the same 
(schematic) answer (namely the act it is not criminalized) with regard to undue advantages 
given subsequently. That is, currently 48 % of respondents mistakenly think that presenting a 
gift to an official either simultaneously or subsequently is not a criminal offence.  
 
Table 15 
Assessment of active bribery of public officials in 196530 and in 2018 (%) 
 1965 
P.V. receives a 
housing allocation. 
He sends a watch to 
the public official 
out of gratitude. Is 
presenting a gift 
allowed in such a 
case? 
2018 
Someone presents a gift 
worth HUF 30,000 to a 
public official after he or 
she has received the 
permission from the 
government to run a 
buffet. Is it criminalized? 
is 
criminalize
d  
78 40 
is not 
criminalize
d  
17 58 
does not 
know 
5 2 
 
 
7. RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
7.1. Summary of the results  
With regard to active bribery of public officials, the level of legal knowledge of the Hungarian 
population is not really high. Very few (11 % of the total sample) knew correctly that giving 
undue advantages to public officials is criminalized only if it takes place before the conclusion 
of an administrative procedure. In contrast, nearly half of those surveyed (48 %) answered that 
an advantage given to a public official is not constitute a criminal offense irrespective of 
whether it is given subsequently or in advance. The other large group, more than a third of the 
respondents (37 %), believed that these acts are qualified as criminal offences, regardless of the 
time and purpose of giving the advantage. 
The willingness of Hungarian people to criminalize active bribery of public officials is rather 
high. Two-thirds of respondents (63 %) would criminalize giving a gift to a public official even 
it takes place after the adjudication of the case. A significant proportion of respondents, 
therefore, do not agree with the current legislation, according to which it does not constitute a 
criminal offence if the gift given subsequently. 
The opinion of two-thirds of the population (67 %) agrees with what they consider to be the 
content of the regulation. The majority of those who have a difference in this regard would 
support criminalization. 
                                                             
30 Kulcsár (1967) Tables 53 and 66. 
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A significant number (30 %) of those who consider it right to penalise giving advantages in 
advance are uninformed, i.e. they (mistakenly) believe that it does not constitute a criminal 
offense under our current law. In contrast, nearly one-third of the population (30 %) is critical 
and also informed in terms of giving a gift subsequently to a public official. Consequently, they 
consciously want to criminalize this second type of act, even they are aware of its impunity 
under the current provisions of Hungarian criminal law. 
In 1965, nearly eight-tenths (78 %) of those surveyed knew (correctly at the time) that it was a 
criminal offence to give a gift to a public official after the case was completed. By 2018, the 
proportion of those with such knowledge has nearly halved, namely 40 % of the population 
believes (incorrectly, but and in accordance with the previous legislation), that this behaviour 
constitutes a criminal offence. However, this is not primarily due to the real knowledge of the 
legal regulation modified in 2013. Currently 48 % of respondents still mistakenly think that 
presenting a gift to a public official either in advance or subsequently does not constitute a 
criminal offence. 
 
7.2. Verification of our hypotheses  
Our hypotheses were partially verified: firstly: The average person has fragmentary knowledge 
about legal regulations on active bribery. However, this is partly due to the fact that the 
respondents, in comparison to the differentiation of the legal regulation, usually have schematic 
knowledge on the subject. Most of them believes that all cases relating to giving advantages to 
public officials are either criminalized or remain unpunished in their full extent. 
Secondly: We practically have not been able to relate the knowledge of regulations to any 
variable which reflects the socio-economic situation. Knowledge about the criminalization of 
active bribery was, however, much more influenced by respondents’ opinions than by socio-
demographic factors. 
Thirdly: 3. More than one third of the respondents answered the questions in line with the old 
regulation (37 %), and only one-tenth of them followed the provisions of the new criminal code 
(11 %). However, this was not necessarily due to actual knowledge of the older regulation, since 
the proportion of those who believe that neither type of act is punishable is even higher (48 %) 
and this answer does not correspond to any actual regulation. 
However, it works expressly against our hypotheses that the new component of the regulation 
on bribery of public officials is rightly known to more people (58 %) than its unchanged element 
(47 %). However, this is explained again by the schematic nature of the responses, since four-
fifths of those whose responses reflected the regulatory novelty also said (erroneously) that the 
other situation is not punished. 
  
12 
 
References 
Bócz E. (1986) Az államigazgatás, az igazságszolgáltatás és a közélet tisztasága elleni 
bűncselekmények (Criminal offences against the state administration, the judiciary and the 
purity of public life) In László Jenő (ed.) A Büntető Törvénykönyv magyarázata /Explanation 
to the Penal Code/ Budapest: KJK. 732-746. 
Engel, D. (1998) How Does Law Matter in the Constitution of Legal Consciousness? In B. 
Garth & A. Sarat (eds.) How Does Law Matter? Chicago: Northwestern University Press. 109–
144. 
Hertogh, M. (2004) A European Conception of Legal Consciousness: Rediscovering Eugen 
Ehrlich. Journal of Law and Society, 4, 457-481.  
Hertogh, M. (2010) Loyalists, Cynics and Outsiders: Who are the Critics of the Justice System 
in the UK and the Netherlands? International Journal of Law in Context, 7, No. 1. 
Hertogh, M. (2018) Nobody’s Law: Legal Consciousness and Legal Alienation in Everyday 
Life. UK: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Hollán M. (2014): Korrupciós bűncselekmények az új büntetőkódexben  (Corruption offences in 
the new penal code). Budapest: HVG-ORAC. 
Krekó P. (2015) Suspicios world, suspicious legal system in: Hunyady Gy. - Berkics M. (eds.): 
Socio-psychology of law. The missing link. Budapest: ELTE Eötvös. 417-433. 
Kulcsár K. (1967) A jogismeret vizsgálata (Assessment of legal knowledge). Budapest: MTA 
JTI. 
Sajó A. - Székelyi M. - Major P. (1977) Vizsgálat a fizikai dolgozók jogtudatáról (Survey on 
the legal knowledge of manual workers). Budapest: MTA ÁJTI. 
Sajó A. (1983) Jogtudat, jogismeret (Legal consciousness, legal knowledge). Budapest: MTA 
Institute of Sociology.  
Sajó A. (1986) Látszat és valóság a jogban (Appearance and reality in law) Budapest: KJK.. 
Sinku P. (2012) A korrupciós bűncselekmények (Corruption offences) In Busch Béla (ed.): 
Büntetőjog II. Különös Rész (Criminal law II. Special part). Budapest: HVG-ORAC. 
Szántó Z. - Tóth I. J. (2008) Üzleti korrupció Magyarországon – többféle nézőpontból 
(Corruption in business in Hungary – from multiple aspects). Accessible: 
https://transparency.hu/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/%C3%9Czleti-korrupci%C3%B3-
Magyarorsz%C3%A1gon-t%C3%B6bbf%C3%A9le-
n%C3%A9z%C5%91pontb%C3%B3l.pdf [Downloaded: 10-12-2019]. 
VIDA M. (2005) „A közélet tisztaság elleni bűncselekmények (Criminal offences against the 
purity of public life) In Nagy Ferenc (ed.) A magyar büntetőjog különös része (The special part 
of Hungarian criminal law). Budapest: Korona. 402-439. 
 
 
© Hollán Miklós, Venczel Timea 
MTA Law Working Papers 
Kiadó: MTA Társadalomtudományi Kutatóközpont 
Székhely: 1097 Budapest, Tóth Kálmán utca 4. 
Felelős kiadó: Boda Zsolt főigazgató 
Felelős szerkesztő: Kecskés Gábor 
Szerkesztőség: Hoffmann Tamás, Mezei Kitti, Szilágyi Emese 
Honlap: http://jog.tk.mta.hu/mtalwp 
E-mail: mta.law-wp@tk.mta.hu 
ISSN 2064-4515 
 
